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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE
BATTLE AGAINST PREDATORY SUBPRIME
LENDING
When Margaret Newton, a 76 year old stroke victim with difficulty
speaking, seeing, and concentrating, was approached by a local contractor,
she was persuaded to purchase siding for $9,990. 1 The purchase agreement
arranged financing for Ms. Newton with United Companies Financial
Corp., a company that securitized its loans, pooled them and sold them on
Wall Street. 2 When the financing closed, Ms. Newton owed not $9,990 but
$15,500, which included $3,050 in points and fees, plus settlement
charges. 3 Her monthly payment was over $240. 4 Moreover, the siding was
not properly installed on her house. 5 Ms. Newton’s total monthly income
was only $898, and unsurprisingly, she fell behind on her loan payments, at
which point United Companies attempted to foreclose. 6 She was not alone
in being targeted for a high priced loan. 7 Since the collapse of the housing
market however, 8 “active trading in most mortgage-backed securities and
other structured credit products has virtually come to a halt.” 9 In
conjunction with the housing collapse and current financial crisis, one
professor has even argued for an outright ban on subprime loans. 10
In the 1990s, “subprime lending was handled mainly by finance
companies that did not fund their high-risk mortgages with federally

1. See generally the findings of fact in Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444
(1998); This case was brought to my attention by Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder In Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 506
(2002).
2. See generally the findings of fact in Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d 444.
3. Id. at 447.
4. Id.
5. It had been constructed without installation, and had to be stripped off and re-installed with
it to be effective. See id.
6. Fortunately for Ms. Newton, she found legal help, sued United Companies, and in
November 1998, the court rescinded her loan and awarded her $2,000, finding that she had not
received the proper loan disclosures. Id.; cf. Mox v. Jordan, 463 N.W. 2d 114 (Mich. App. 1990)
(family that fell victim to the holder in due course doctrine were forced to pay back a $31,000 loan
they never received). This case was brought to my attention by Eggert, supra note 1.
7. While in the mid 1990s “fewer than five percent of mortgage loan originations were
subprime, by 2005 the figure had jumped to approximately twenty percent.” Testimony of Sandra
F. Braunstein, Dir., Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs—Fed. Reserve Bd., Subprime
Mortgages, before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, Comm. on Fin. Serv., U.S.
House of Representatives, (Mar. 27, 2007).
8. See Standard & Poors (S&P), National Trend of Home Price Declines Continued through
the First Half of 2008 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, tbl. 1 (Aug. 26,
2008).
9. Sam Ali, The Odd Mandate that Ate Wall St. SEC urged to abolish mark-to-market rules,
THE STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 5, 2008, at 1.
10. Alan
M.
White,
The
Case
for
Banning
Subprime
Mortgages,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133609#.
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insured bank deposits.” 11 By 2002, this market expanded, “with big banks
[or hedge funds] now controlling ‘five of the nation’s top ten subprime
[lenders],’ and several other prominent national banks investing in the
subprime market either by extending lines of credit to subprime lenders, or
by purchasing subprime loans.” 12 Regulatory changes such as the
deregulation of the banking industry, the desire for increased profits, “the
absence of mainstream lenders in low-income neighborhoods, tax breaks
for interest on second mortgages, and ‘appreciating real estate values’ [all]
made conditions ripe for many subprime lenders to engage in predatory
practices.” 13 Currently, however, “[s]everal structural and economic factors
have recently slowed subprime growth and increased delinquencies and
foreclosures.” 14 The rise in short term interest rates, along with the decrease
in the rate of home price appreciation, are just two factors contributing to
the rise in delinquencies and foreclosures. 15 “As a result of mounting
defaults and delinquencies, one of the largest subprime lenders, New
Century Financial Corporation, filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007,” and
the collapse of this industry has led many other lenders to file for
bankruptcy, while others have “simply exited the subprime market
altogether.” 16
Most of all, predatory subprime lenders have entered this market
because of significant monetary incentives. 17 “The borrowers in this
[predatory] market are people who, because of historical credit rationing,
discrimination, and other social and economic forces, are disconnected from
the credit market.” 18 Brokers and originators continue to exploit borrowers’
disconnection to the credit market and make loans with predatory terms.
High-pressure tactics such as door-to-door solicitation and repeated phone
calls in order to intimidate homeowners into acquiring high-cost loans are

11. Anne-Marie Motto, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying
the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859 (2002).
12. Id. at 859.
13. Id. at 859–60.
14. Dr. Faten Sabry & Dr. Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer, Part I of
a NERA Insight Series (June 21, 2007) at 2, http://www.nera.com/image/SEC_SubprimeSeries_
Part1_ June2007_FINAL.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. It has been estimated that subprime loan originations increased from $35 billion in 1994 to
$160 billion in 1999, which has been attributed to refinancings and profitable spreads. See DEP’T
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 30, 45 (June 2000) [hereinafter HUDTREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
18. “They have a range of credit ratings and some actually would qualify for prime loans . . .
while others cannot afford any credit regardless of the terms.” Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1255, 1279 (2002) [hereinafter A Tale of Three Markets].

2008]

The Battle Against Predatory Subprime Lending

215

just some of the predatory practices they use. 19 Additionally, even if
borrowers read the loan documents carefully, these documents are “usually
complex enough to make an attorney’s eyes cross, leaving little hope that
a[n] [average] consumer can wade through the legal double talk.” 20
This exploitation has led to wide-ranging harms to borrowers, who have
little legal recourse against lenders and brokers. 21 First, lenders and brokers
shift their litigation risk to the secondary market via securitization of these
loans. 22 Securitization protects the lenders and brokers from litigation risk
because of the protections afforded by the holder in due course rule and
weaknesses in the current rules and regulation. 23 Second, “[s]ecuritization
drives up the price of subprime loans because investors demand a lemons
premium for investing in subprime mortgage-backed securities.” 24 As a
result, the costs to borrowers are substantial, and “one study estimated that
lengthy prepayment penalties in securitized subprime loans boosted
borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by sixteen to twenty percent.” 25 Third, these
foreclosures harm the cities where these borrowers default on their loans, as
“declining property values resulting from predatory lending mean reduced
tax revenues just as abandoned buildings lead to increased demand for fire
and police protection.” 26 Therefore, changes must be made to this industry

19. Others include, subprime lenders urging borrowers to “sign loan documents without
reading them or with key terms left blank,” and selling borrowers unnecessary insurance or other
products along with the loan. See Motto, supra note 11, at 860; see also Nat’l Assn of Consumer
Advoc., Predatory Lending Practices, http://www.naca.net/predatory-lending-practices (last
visited Oct. 25, 2008).
20. See Motto, supra note 11, at 860.
21. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041 (2007) [hereinafter, Turning a Blind Eye].
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also infra Part IV and Part V.
24. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2041. The “lemons premium” exists as a result of
the high default risk of borrowers in the subprime lending market, and is the high price on the
interest payments that borrowers pay in their loan payments to subprime lenders. This premium
makes these securitized loans attractive investments.
25. Id. Balloon clauses in those loans raised borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by an additional
fifty percent. See generally Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, The
Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment
Penalties and Balloon Payments, Ctr. for Community Capitalism, Kenan Institute for Private
Enters. U.N.C., (Jan. 25, 2005).
26. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006); see also, e.g., ACORN FAIR HOUS., PREDATORY LENDING
IN SOUTH CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA: A REVIEW OF RISING FORECLOSURE FILINGS AND THE
RELATIONSHIP TO PREDATORY LENDING 4 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Predatory_Lending/FINAL_REPORT.pdf (documenting a 186%
increase in foreclosure filings in south central Pennsylvania between 1997 and 2002); STEVEN C.
BOURASSA, URBAN STUDIES INST., PREDATORY LENDING IN JEFFERSON COUNTY: A REPORT TO
LOUISVILLE
URBAN
LEAGUE
3
(Dec.
2003),
available
at
THE
http://www.lul.org/Predatory%20Lending%20Report.pdf (citing a 288% increase in foreclosures
in Kentucky between 1995 and 2002); ZACH SCHILLER ET AL., POLICY MATTERS OHIO, HOME
INSECURITY 2004: FORECLOSURE GROWTH IN OHIO 3 (Aug. 2004), available at
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to prevent these predatory lenders and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that
securitize these loans from continuing to profit at the expense of borrowers,
cities and investors.
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the subprime lending
problem, a definition of predatory lending and an explanation of the typical
practices that it entails. Part II describes the emergence, growth and risks of
securitization of subprime home mortgage loans. It further explains why
predatory lending persists despite the substantial risk inherent in
management techniques employed by securitization. 27 Part III identifies and
discusses remedies available to victims of predatory subprime lending and
the inadequacies of the remedies in protecting consumers and preventing
further predatory lending. Then, Part IV argues that assignee liability on
securitized trusts, put forth in a March 2007 article by Kathleen C. Engel
and Patricia A. McCoy (Engel and McCoy), is currently too radical a
change to the secondary market. 28 Finally, Part V argues that borrowers and
investors should have recourse against SPVs, as they are in a position to
identify the quality and suitability of the securitized loans for investors, and
further discusses potential remedies 29 and ways to improve extant remedies
to combat predatory subprime lending.
I. PREDATORY LENDING DEFINED
“One of the key financial developments of the 1990s was the
emergence and rapid growth of subprime mortgage lending.” 30 Access to
credit through the subprime lending market is necessary and appropriate for
those who cannot obtain credit through a prime loan but are still capable of
making their mortgage payments in a timely manner. 31 “Borrowers who
present elevated risk levels can look to the subprime market for credit . . .
and take advantage of” lenders looking to provide higher interest loans
which can supply “mortgage capital and flexible, subprime loan
products.” 32 “However, these high-risk borrowers are charged interest and
fees by subprime lenders that exceed the rate that traditional prime
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/Home_Insecurity_2004.pdf (noting a doubling of
foreclosure rates in Ohio between 1998 and 2003).
27. For more information, see generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21.
28. Id. at 2042.
29. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1255. The authors argued for a Self Regulatory
Organization (SRO), overseen by the federal government, to regulate the lending industry and
securitization of loans as a way to deal with the predatory lending problem. This is one such
remedy that may effectively combat this problem. See id. at 1259.
30. Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Remarks at the Fin. Serv. Roundtable Annual Hous.
Policy Meeting, 1 (May 21, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm).
31. Kevin M. Cuff, Op-Ed., Subprime Lending Misconceptions, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 22,
2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/22/
subprime_lending_misconceptions/.
32. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1279.
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borrowers pay.” 33 Subprime lenders provide an important service, but they
are not all reputable and some can be destructive.
Predatory lenders are defined by their methods of lending and their
target borrowers. “Predatory lenders rely on misrepresentation, threats,
unfair pressure and borrower ignorance to engage in their deceptive lending
practices.” 34 As one court 35 notes, predatory lending is a “mismatch
between the needs and capacity of the borrower . . . . In essence, the loan
does not fit the borrower, either because the borrower’s underlying needs
for the loan are not being met or the terms of the loan are so
disadvantageous to that particular borrower that there is little likelihood the
borrower has the capability to repay the loan.” 36 Predatory lenders often
target vulnerable populations, resulting in devastating personal loss,
including bankruptcy, poverty and foreclosure. 37 Subprime lenders who do
not engage in predatory practices can be referred to as “legitimate subprime
lenders.” 38 By contrast, “[p]redatory lenders penetrate communities and,
like polluters, leave distressed properties and desperate people in their
wake.” 39 As a result, there is growing concern that “it may not be in the best
interest of borrowers or the neighborhoods in which they reside for such
loans to be extended in the first place.” 40
Predatory lending is comprised of various abusive practices. These
practices result in serious disproportionate net harm to borrowers. One
example is “asset-based lending, 41 which entails making loans to borrowers

33. Id.
34. Eggert, supra note 1, at 507.
35. See generally Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super.2001)

(allowing borrowers’ discrimination and unconscionability claims and defenses to proceed in a
foreclosure action under the Consumer Fraud Act, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,
the Fair Housing Act, and the Civil Rights Act).
36. Id. This case was brought to my attention by Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Don’t Fit,
Don’t Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory
Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 117, 119–20 (2001) (pointing out predatory
lending is easier to discuss than it is to define).
37. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (Summer, 2006)
(describing Associates First Capital’s notorious predatory lending practices in 2000, including
“high interest rates, upfront fees, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties, [as well as]
aggressively selling single-premium credit insurance and ‘flipping’ or refinancing loans to
generate additional fees without benefit to the borrower”). See also Nat’l Assn of Consumer
Advoc., supra note 19.
38. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1279.
39. Engel, supra note 26, at 355.
40. Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from
Disparate Cities, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 603, 604 (2004).
41. This has been defined as the “pattern or practice” of making high-cost mortgages to
consumers based on the consumer’s collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay
(based upon the consumer’s current and expected income, current obligations and employment
status). See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 78.
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whom the lender knows cannot afford the monthly payments.” 42 Another
practice is harmful “rent-seeking,” 43 where the subprime lenders charge
fees and interest rates that are exorbitant 44 compared to the risk that the
borrowers present. 45 Many predatory loans may also involve illegal fraud or
deception by brokers or lenders. 46 For example, brokers or lenders may
procure inflated appraisals or make false promises to refinance loans down
the road on better terms. 47 Other forms of non-transparency are harmful but
do not amount to fraud, such as when lenders or brokers prevent borrowers
from comparison shopping by withholding rate sheets. 48 A disproportionate
number of lenders also engage in lending discrimination, by imposing more
onerous terms on members of protected groups, resulting in further
injustice. 49 Perhaps the most oppressive practice in the subprime lending
market is requiring borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress in loan
documents. 50 For example, subprime loans often contain mandatory
arbitration clauses that require borrowers to take disputes to arbitration and
42. Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer for
America’s Families, ch. 5 & nn.5–6 (1996), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
reports/moseley/chap5.htm.
43. Cisco Systems defines “rent-seeking” as “[w]hen a company, organization, or individual
uses their resources to obtain economic gain from others without reciprocating any benefits back
to society through wealth creation. See Cisco Systems Glossary, available at
http://investor.cisco.com/glossary.cfm?FirstLetter=r. See also Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of
Political Economy Terms, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/rent-seeking_behavior (last
visited Oct. 27, 2008).
44. These fees are not directly reflected in interest rates, and because they can be financed, are
easy to disguise or downplay by lenders. Moreover, while on competitive loans, fees below 1% of
the loan amount are typical, predatory loans commonly have fees totaling more than 5% of the
loan amount. See Nat’l Assn of Consumer Advoc., supra note 19.
45. This practice encompasses steering borrowers towards less favorable terms and charging
prepayment penalties and points without a corresponding cut in the interest rate as is customary in
the prime market. Howard Lax et. al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic
Efficiency, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 533, 535 (2004); Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage
Pricing: Present and Future Research, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504 (2004). As noted
above, the high interest rates and loan charge fees, and commensurate high returns are what make
the securitized subprime loans attractive investments. Thus there is incentive for the parties
involved in securitization to allow such an abusive practice to continue.
46. See generally Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing:
A Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 129 (2005).
47. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 79–80.
48. Neither the Truth in Lending Act nor the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act requires
disclosure of rate sheets to borrowers. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1255.
49. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect
of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages at 4 (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf (documenting numerous
disparities, including that African-American borrowers with prepayment penalties on their
subprime home loans were six to thirty-four percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than
if they had been white borrowers with similar qualifications. Results varied depending on the type
of interest rate (i.e., fixed or adjustable) and the purpose (refinance or purchase) of the loan).
50. See A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 851, 872 (2007). See generally Patricia McCoy, Elder Law; A Behavioral Analysis of
Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005).
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preclude them from joining class actions, thus denying borrowers access to
the courts. 51
Unlike predatory loans, legitimate subprime loans do not display any of
the markers of abuse listed above. 52 Nevertheless, although “predatory
loans are not necessarily subprime,” they are most prevalent in the
subprime market. 53 Once these loans are securitized and sold in secondary
financial markets, the dangers of predatory lending are magnified. 54
II. SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME HOME MORTGAGE
LOANS
Securitization “is the process of converting packages of home loans into
securities that are backed by collateral in the form of [those] loans.” 55 The
two-tiered structure of securitization protects investors by preventing
creditors of lenders from reaching the assets backing the securities if the
lender went bankrupt. 56 This remoteness from bankruptcy in turn “boosts
ratings of securitized offerings, [as] rating agencies evaluate and rate
securitized loan pools.” 57 “SPVs protect investors from the risk of the
lender’s bankruptcy, [and] often [make it] possible for [a] loan [pool] to
earn a higher rating than the lender itself would receive” if rated on an
individual basis. “In this way, ‘non-investment grade and unrated
originators (the majority of the market) [are able to] create investmentgrade transactions.’” 58
In a securitization, once the original lender has made loans to
borrowers, “investment banks take pools of home loans, carve up the cash
flows from those receivables, and convert the cash flows into bonds that are
secured by the mortgages; the bonds are variously known as residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS).” 59
Securitizers structure the transaction to isolate the loan pool from the

51. See Democratic Candidates on Mortgage Reform, 27-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 56 (Feb.
2008).
52. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1261.
53. Id.
54. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Point – Counterpoint: Federal Preemption: The
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exxceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 312–13
(2004) (stating that as of 2004, “the four most costly bank failures since 1997—resulting in total
losses to the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] (the ‘FDIC’) of $ 1.7 billion involved
institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and securitization.”).
55. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274.
56. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133,
142 (1994).
57. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2046.
58. Id. (quoting Henry C. McCall III & Len Blum, Evolution of the B&C Home-Equity Loan
Securities Market, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 237 (Anand K. Bhattacharyi & Frank J.
Fabozzi Eds., 1996)).
59. Id. at 2045.
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original lender by selling the loan pool to a SPV 60 that passively holds the
loans, and is owned by, but legally distinct from, the lender. 61 “The SPV
then resells the loan pool to a second SPV [typically in the form of a trust],
which is also [legally] independent of the lender and takes title to the
bundle.” 62 Next, by adding credit enhancements to the loan pool, the SPV
reduces the risks associated with loan payment defaults by borrowers. 63
“Internal” credit enhancements include recourse arrangements and seniorsubordinated structures, and “external” credit enhancements include
irrevocable letters of credit, or financial guaranty insurance from third
parties with triple-A credit ratings. 64 “The SPV then creates and issues the
mortgage-backed securities and sells the securities to investors.” 65 While in
some cases, the seller of the loans retains the servicing rights (i.e., collects
the loan payments) and distributes the proceeds to investors, in other cases,
the SPV services the loans. 66
The 1980s saw an increase in both the variety of lenders and available
capital. 67 Subprime securitization, first pioneered in the 1970s, allowed
lenders to make more loans in low- and moderate-income (LMI)
neighborhoods. 68 In the 1970s, Freddie Mac spearheaded the securitization
of mortgages in an effort to increase the amount of available mortgage

60. These are “also referred to as a ‘bankruptcy-remote entity’ whose operations are limited to
the acquisition and financing of specific assets.” They “serve as a counterparty for swaps and
other
credit
sensitive
derivative
instruments.”
See
Investopedia,
SPV,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spv.asp.
61. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045; see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1552–53 (2004) (focusing on the
“nonconforming” or “private label” market).
62. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045.
63. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274.
64. The SPV will typically raise the credit rating of the securities relative to the lender’s own
rating, or relative to what would be assigned to the underlying collateral. The amount of credit
enhancements required depends on several factors, including “rating agencies’ views of the
historical performance of the assets, the degree of diversification across obligors, industries, etc.
and the structure of the transaction.” See Stephen A. Lumpkin, Fundamentals of Asset-Backed
Securities Markets, Second International Roundtable on Securities Markets in China, OECD
Shanghai at 14–16 (June 6–7, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/45/
2756089.pdf.
65. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274.
66. Id. at 1288 (Some investors “are requiring that lenders retain the loan-servicing rights, in
which case the lenders would have some interest in creditworthiness because servicing costs rise
with the risk of default”); cf. Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage
Servicers, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 603, 753–54 (discussing servicing abuses, and explaining that
once loans are securitized, a servicer typically becomes responsible for collecting the loan
payments and distributing the proceeds, and as a result, some servicers have employed abusive
and illegal servicing practices, including charging unjustified fees, actively pushing borrowers into
default, and employing exploitative collection methods).
67. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1273.
68. See id.; see also Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1261, 1267–71 (1991).
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capital. 69 Widespread securitization of mortgages began in the 1980s, 70 and
“by 1993, sixty percent of home-mortgage loans were securitized.” 71
Through technological advances in the early 1990s, it became possible to
estimate and price the risk of subprime home loan pools, paving the way for
subprime securitizations. 72 Prior to the subprime crisis, most subprime loans
were securitized, 73 which led “to claims that securitization facilitates
predatory lending” 74 and that the entities involved should actively police
lenders. 75 Although securitization continues, 76 currently, there are two
proposed accounting rule changes by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board 77 (FASB) which some believe may wipe out the market for assetbacked securitization. 78 The first rule change, to Financial Accounting
Standard 140 (FAS 140), proposes “elimination of qualified special-purpose
entities, which provide a way for banks to keep securitized assets off their
balance sheets.” 79 According to a TowerGroup report, forcing securitized
assets onto the balance sheet could erode banks’ annual net earnings by
more than $60 billion and require billions of dollars in additional loan
reserves and recapitalization. 80 Changes to FASB Interpretation No. 46
(FIN 46(R)), “would provide new, more stringent criteria for when banks
are allowed to transfer ownership of securitized assets and liabilities.” 81
Despite fears of a possible halt in securitization, others argue the proposed
69. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1273.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1273 (quoting Leon T. Kendall); see also Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New

Era in American Finance, in 172 A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 2, 2–3 (Leon T. Kendall &
Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
72. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045.
73. In 2005, total securitizations of subprime and home equity loans ballooned to an estimated
$525.7 billion. As of 2006, and prior to the credit crisis lenders securitized almost eighty percent
of subprime mortgages. See Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Rating Transitions 2005: U.S. RMBS
Volume and Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, tbl. 1 (Jan. 24, 2006).
74. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2040. These claims are correct as will be explained
later in this note. See infra Parts IV and V.
75. Id.
76. According to a survey by Asset Backed Alert, as of October 23, 2008, the year to date
volume of asset-backed securities issued totaled $696.4 billion versus $917.2 billion in 2007. See
Asset Backed Alert, Banker’s Glossary, http://www.abalert.com/Public/MarketPlace/
MarketStatistics/index.cfm.
77. “Officially recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange Commission,” the
FASB services “the investing public through transparent information resulting from high-quality
financial reporting standards.” “Since 1973, the FASB has been the designated organization in the
private sector for establishing standards of financial accounting and reporting.” Financial
Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission.
78. See Alan Rappeport, Securitization’s Last Throes?, CFO.com, (Oct. 24, 2008) available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12494397?f=most_read.
79. Id.
80. See Joseph Rosta, Proposals Take Aim at Securitization, U.S. Banker, (Oct. 2008) (quoting
research director for bankcards at TowerGroup Dennis Moroney), available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/usb_article.html?id=200810281O5Q771O.
81. Rappeport, supra note 78. For a more detailed discussion, see Rosta, supra note 80.
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rule change would have “little impact” 82 or will not take effect until “after
the financial sector is well on the mend.” 83 Nonetheless, entities involved in
securitization profit from these practices, so they continue to resist
addressing these problems and serve as major conduits for predatory
loans. 84 As an excerpt from the now embattled 85 Merrill Lynch & Co.
prospectus in 2004 illustrates, the entities involved in securitization rarely
investigate the process of underwriting subprime loans before the crisis:
With the exception of approximately 20.82% of the mortgage loans in the
statistical mortgage pool that were underwritten in accordance with the
underwriting criteria of The Winter Group, underwriting criteria are
generally not available with respect to the mortgage loans. In many
instances the mortgage loans in the statistical mortgage pool were acquired
by Terwin Advisors LLC from sources, including mortgage brokers and
other non-originators that could not provide detailed information regarding
the underwriting guidelines of the originators. 86

Merrill Lynch’s admission exemplifies how Wall Street firms have
been securitizing subprime home loans without determining if loan pools
contain predatory loans. In the worst situations, secondary market actors
have actively facilitated abusive lending. 87 In fact, as of 2002, Kathleen
Engel and Patricia McCoy said “it is now routine for lenders to originate
loans, and sell them to secondary-market institutions, which provide a
steady stream of capital to lend.” 88 As a result, subprime securitization
helped perpetuate the predatory lending cycle.
The process of spreading risk through “tranches” has further hidden the
inherent risk in predatory lending. Once loans are transferred to the second
82. Id. (quoting former FASB member Ed Trott). James Mountain, a partner at Deloitte &
Touche agreed. See id.
83. Rosta, supra note 80.
84. Predatory lending lawsuits continue to arise over these practices. See, e.g., Stuckey v.
Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005); Bankers Trust Co. v. West, No. 20984, 2002 WL
31114844 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2002).
85. The troubled Merrill Lynch & Co. was bought by Bank of America in a $50 billion all
stock transaction. See Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch Creating Unique Financial Services
Firm, (Sept. 15, 2008), http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?s=press_releases&
item=8255; see also Ellen Messmer, Lehman failure, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch buyout
shake
Wall
Street
again,
NETWORK
WORLD,
(Sept.
15,
2008),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091508-wall-street-shakeup.html?fsrc=netflash-rss.
86. Merrill Lynch & Co., Prospectus to Prospectus dated June 18, 2004 (Form 424B5), at S-16
(June
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/809940/
000095013604002052/0000950136-04-002052.txt.
87. See Austin v. Chisick, (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659–65 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact). After allegedly learning of FAMCO’s fraud during due
diligence, Lehman Brothers nevertheless gave “substantial assistance” through securitization to
help finance FAMCO’s operations. This case was brought to my attention by Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2061 n.107 (2007).
88. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274.
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SPV, tranches of bonds are created by the investment bank for the issuer. 89
Rating agencies then measure the credit risk of each tranche by comparing
historical data with the loan pools and forecasting the tranche’s
performance. 90 Sequential tranches are one way in which securitization
protects investors (assignees) from credit risk, as investors benefit from
conservative risk assessments by rating agencies 91 and can avoid risk
through investing in the more highly-rated tranches. 92 However, if the
suitability of these loans to the borrowers was taken into account, tranches
would logically receive lower ratings when comprised of unsuitable loans
to subprime borrowers. 93 The less suitable the loans, the less likely the
borrowers are able to pay off the loans and thus, the more unlikely it is that
investors in these bonds will get paid back. 94
By making possible a constant flow of money to the home mortgage
market, securitization dramatically altered the once highly regulated
business of mortgage lending. Prior to the current credit crisis, banks and
other lenders no longer suffered from liquidity restraints and more funds
became available to lend. 95 At the height of the subprime bubble, lenders no
longer needed “to be large financial institutions with significant deposits
and capitalization, and instead sparsely capitalized mortgage bankers and
finance companies originated loans for sale on the secondary market.” 96 As
a result, the illegitimate subprime lenders successfully took advantage of
borrowers through predatory lending. In addition, predatory lenders
continue to avoid liability, and are not forced to obey proper lending
practices because of continued failure of risk management in this industry.

89. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2046. The “issuer” is the SPV that issues securities.
90. However, rating agencies do not assess the suitability of the underlying loans for

individual borrowers in calculating the credit risk. See id.
91. This is because the rating agencies work for the lenders, and are thereby incentivized to
provide them with conservative risk assessments. See Ethan Penner, Can the Financial Markets
Make a Comeback?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at A11; see also infra Part VI.
92. Although not the focus of this comment, in their Fordham Law Review Article, Kathleen
C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy provide a clear, detailed explanation of how, through conservative
risk assessments by rating agencies, senior tranches have had numerous upgrades in their ratings,
yet only one downgrade between 2003 and 2005, despite rising subprime loan default rates. See
Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2055–56.
93. Id. at 2046–47.
94. Investor’s likelihood of repayment is a major aspect of bond ratings. The “tranche system,”
the predominant structure of choice in subprime RMBS, is termed a “senior subordinate structure”
and tranches are arrayed from the most senior (AAA tranche) to the most junior (BBB, BB, B and
unrated tranche classes). A rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is deemed investment-grade, a title that
serves to calm investors’ concerns about the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities
that they are investing in. The tranche system is paid off in a “waterfall” system, and the senior
tranche is paid off before any other. Consequently, the junior tranche is the first to absorb any
losses, making it appear doubtful the senior tranche will absorb credit losses. See id. at 2046–47.
95. Moreover, non-bank lenders have entered the home-mortgage market through the
opportunities created by securitization. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274.
96. Id.
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III. WHY PREDATORY LENDING PERSISTS DESPITE RISK
MANAGEMENT
In a 2007 article, Engel and McCoy identify numerous problems with
attempts in risk management to protect investors from risk and curb
continued predatory lending practices. 97 They examine how, despite
attempts at creating lending-market discipline by the secondary market,
predatory lending has persisted through diversification, the tranche system,
lax disclosure and the excess demand for securitization. 98 The article
discusses the need to exert discipline on subprime lenders and proposes
forcing them to retain some of the risk associated with loan pools. 99 It
focuses on how, although risk management measures are designed to
incentivize lenders to make proper loans and cut default risk, none of these
measures, singly or together, have curbed abusive lending. 100
A. THE EVIL ALLIANCE
The first problem identified by Engel and McCoy is the conflict of
interest created when lenders work for the SPVs, or, as they call it, the
“unholy alliance of marginal lenders and loan aggregators.” 101 It has
increasingly become the practice for subprime lenders to sell whole loans to
outside loan aggregators, generally affiliates or subsidiaries wholly- owned
by Wall Street investment banks, 102 who bundle and securitize them.
Because subprime aggregation offered advantages to both the investment
banks and lenders, it increasingly became popular, “accounting for 42% of
the subprime securitizations in 2002.” 103 It furthered investment banks’
underwriting business and helped them assemble diversified loan pools. 104
The advantage of a diversified loan pool is that the bad loans with low
ratings are aggregated with the better higher rated loans, and thus the
overall pool receives a high enough rating to be securitized and sold to
investors. 105 The advantage of aggregation is particularly strong for small or
poorly capitalized lenders, as aggregation permits them to sell loan pools
for securitization “that would otherwise be too small to provide
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2063.
Id. at 2064–65.
Id. at 2064.
See id.; see also Quercia, supra note 25, at 4–5.
Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065. “Loan aggregators” refers to SPVs who
securitize the loans and sell them to investors on the secondary market.
102. At the height of the securitization market, major players included Credit Suisse First
Boston, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bear, Stearns & Co., Merrill Lynch, Greenwich
Capital, UBS, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank Securities. See Bill Shepherd, Perils and
Phantasm: The Mortgage Securitization Boom is Threatened by Recession, Legislation and Rate
Change, Investment Dealers Dig., Feb. 3, 2003 available at http://www.adco.com/announcements/IDD.pdf; see also Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065.
103. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065 n.122.
104. Id. at 2065.
105. See generally id.
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diversification.” 106 Thus, aggregation allows investment banks to enjoy
subprime profits with reduced legal risk through diversification.
Consequently, “Wall Street prizes aggregation” and “[b]ecause they have
minimal exposure to suits, aggregators have reduced incentives to guard
against abusive practices” by lenders. 107
B. THROWING OUT THE TRASH
The second issue the article discusses is that lenders do not always
retain an interest in the subordinated tranches that they have helped create,
so they are disinterested in the quality of the loans in those tranches. 108
Through an affiliate, lenders often buy securities in the lowest-rated
tranches, and in conjunction provide those tranches with credit
enhancements. 109 Although it appears that the lender retains the riskiest
securities, this is not necessarily the case because lenders typically sell to
outside investors (principally real estate investment trusts, hedge funds and
overseas investors) who want to buy many of these so-called “residuals,” 110
either at the time of offering, or through later secondary market resales. 111
Moreover, lenders can sell their subprime residuals to outside investors
“through bonds known as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),” which
essentially securitize residuals from RMBS and other assets. 112 Because
106. More importantly, “aggregation enables marginal lenders to obtain financing despite
obscure or questionable reputations by ‘renting’ the aggregator’s reputation for quality securities.”
See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. These credit enhancements are “usually in the form of an insurance policy or a letter of
credit from a financial institution that backs some or all of the securities issued in the transaction
(e.g., total value of the asset pool or securities issue, or possibly a governmental guarantee on
mortgage loans).” See Angela Petrucci, Note, Accounting for Asset Securitization in a Full
Disclosure World, 30 J. LEGIS. 327, 331 (2004).
110. The residuals are the lowest rated tranches that “receive the excess cash flow that remains
after all of the payments due to the holders of other tranches and all of the administrative expenses
have been met,” and are the BB- and B- subprime tranches. See American Banker, Banker’s
Glossary, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/glossary.html?alpha=R (last visited Oct.
30, 2008). These are attractive investments for those who have a greater appetite for risk, because
the potential payoff far exceeds those of the senior, more highly rated tranches.
111. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065; see also Ruth Simon et al., HousingBubble Talk Doesn’t Scare Off Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at A1.
112. “Significantly, U.S. subprime RMBS have comprised the single ‘largest collateral asset
class in [CDOs] since the inception of the product in 1999.’” Although the central purpose of
residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the credit risk they create, when lenders with
subprime residuals are permitted to transfer them off their books through CDOs, “they are able to
escape the market discipline that residuals were meant to exert.” See Turning a Blind Eye, supra
note 21, at 2066.
For example, if a bank issuing mortgage backed securities had $1 billion in mortgages, and
they created a CDO for the $1 billion with $300 million for the residual tranche, $300 million for
the junior tranche and $400 million for the senior tranche it would be cut up as follows: the bank
would sell 400,000 shares at $1,000 per share and 6% interest to the senior tranche, which would
amount to a $24 million per year interest payment for the senior tranche. If to the junior tranche
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predatory lenders can dispose of these residuals (the riskiest tranche
classes), the incentive for these lenders to avoid making predatory loans is
removed. 113 “As one CDO manager put it, CDOs create ‘an awful lot of
moral hazard in the [subprime RMBS] sector.’” 114 Thus, this attempt at risk
management in lending is subverted as predatory lenders are able to sell the
residuals and their accompanying risk on the secondary market.
C. THE NOT SO DILIGENT
Engel and McCoy next address how the due diligence required by
current state and federal law is often cursory and is consequently
ineffective. 115 Because of inherent conflicts of interest, the best practices
adopted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been adopted in the
subprime secondary market voluntarily, and will not screen out predatory
loans from loan pools unless compelled by changes in regulation. 116 Despite
recent court reactions such as In Re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 117 and
state assignee liability laws, “industry and government observers agree that
subprime due diligence is uneven and in need of improvement.” 118 This is
true for both public offerings of subprime RMBS (where institutional
investors often have a real chance to insist on meaningful due diligence in
advance), and even more so for Rule 144A private placements. 119 In fact,
the high demand for Rule 144A offerings has forced institutional investors
to make snap judgments whether to invest, without time for any substantive
due diligence. 120 Most simply rely on the efforts of lenders, underwriters,
and rating agencies, “even though none of these entities has the same level
they sold 300,000 shares at $1,000 per share and 7% interest which would amount to a $21 million
per year interest payment. Everything else would go to the residual, which here would be 300,000
shares at $1000 and 18.3% interest which equates to a $55 million per year interest payment.
Thus, although the residual has the potential to be paid the most per year, they have to wait to be
paid until all the more senior tranches have been paid first, which if there are significant defaults.
This hypothetical was addressed by Professor Minor Myers, B.A., J.D., of Brooklyn Law School.
113. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2066.
114. Allison Pyburn, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, Asset
Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005, http://www.asreport.com (on file with author).
115. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21.
116. Id.
117. Austin v. Chisick, (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659–65 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2003).
118. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068.
119. “Rule 144A provides an exemption and permits the public resale of restricted or control
securities if a number of conditions are met, including how long the securities are held, the way in
which they are sold, and the amount that can be sold at any one time. But even if you’ve met the
conditions of the rule, you can’t sell your restricted securities to the public until you’ve gotten a
transfer agent to remove the legend.” Securities Act Rule 144, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission Homepage, http://www.sec.gov/asnwers/rule144.htm (Oct. 6, 2003). Rule 144A
private placements, thus allow predatory subprime loans to get past SEC regulation, if they qualify
for the exemption, which can easily be accomplished by the sophisticated parties involved in these
transactions. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068.
120. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068.
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of interest in avoiding credit losses as the investors themselves.” 121 As a
result of this reliance, due diligence in the private-label subprime market
often sets a very low bar and rarely succeeds in screening out predatory
loan terms or practices.
As of 2007, underwriters, rating agencies, and lenders conducted most
subprime due diligence, not investors, and typically, due diligence was
limited to determining “lender compliance with state and federal consumer
protections laws.” 122 “For example, automated compliance systems tailor
their screening tools to the legal requirements of each jurisdiction.” 123 Only
screening for legal compliance has been required for rating agencies, and
they have not been required to follow the industry’s “best practices.” 124 For
example, the principal federal anti-predatory lending law, the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), 125 has strong proscriptions
against predatory lending, but at best covers the costliest five percent of
subprime home loans. 126 Many states are in need of resilient anti-predatory
lending laws, and as legal protections against abusive subprime loans are
also weak at the federal level, this lack of meaningful due diligence allows
securitized loan pools to include predatory loans without meaningful
consequences. 127
Even where due diligence is required, it is not uncommon for some
lenders to say they performed loan-level review when they did not.128 In the

121. Only those that are “observationally illegal,” are attempted to be screened out. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068; see also ComplianceEase,

ComplianceAnalyzer, http://www.Complianceease.com.
124. This is problematic, as there are large existing gaps in governing law, and therefore
numerous lending abuses remain legal under state and federal law. Although not the focus of this
comment, legislators continue to debate the proper path to take in order to close the gaps that exist
in current state and federal laws. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068–69.
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000). This act amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and
established requirements for certain loans with high rates and/or high fees, setting out disclosure
requirements, prohibited features, and actions that one may take against a lender who is violating
the law. See Federal Trade Commission Homepage, Facts for Consumers: High-Rate, High-Fee
Loans (HOEPA/Section 32 Mortgages), (Jan. 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/
homes/rea19.shtm.
126. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226); but see Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994:
Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants,
18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 152 (arguing that, although it has limits, HOEPA can be a
“powerful vehicle for regulating the home equity lending market and for challenging abusive
lending practices through the courts.”).
127. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2069.
128. “In 2004, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office or
GAO) looked at this issue and concluded that ‘some companies may be more willing than others
to purchase loans that are considered questionable in terms of legal compliance, creditworthiness,
or other factors.” Moreover, as one subprime lender explained to the press, “[w]e’re not
structured to do 100 percent due diligence [on certain subprime pools], even though Wall Street
investment banks might want that.” See id.
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conforming market, 129 both government-sponsored-entities (GSEs) (i.e.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) require substantive screening of subprime
loans. 130 They “have best practices standards for residential mortgages to
borrowers with blemished credit that are stricter in some respects than the
laws in many jurisdictions.” 131 Yet, as of September 7, 2008, “the
government seized Fannie and Freddie which together own or guarantee
half the nation’s mortgages, after months of uncertainty about their
future.” 132 Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director James B.
Lockhart explained “after exhaustive review [of Fannie and Freddie] I have
determined that the companies cannot continue to operate safely and
soundly and fulfill their critical public mission, without significant action to
address our concerns” and placed the GSEs in a conservatorship. 133 While
their fate remains undetermined, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
recently suggested “[h]aving Fannie and Freddie compete as private
firms—perhaps after breaking them into smaller units” as a way to
“eliminate the conflict between private shareholders and public policy,
diminish risks to the overall economy and financial system and allow them
to be more innovative by operating with less political interference.” 134
Until the recent financial crisis, outside of the conforming market,
“lenders, issuers, and/or major investors [were] free to adopt internal

129. The conforming market refers to “[a] mortgage that is equal to or less than the dollar
amount established by the conforming loan limit set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Federal
regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) and meets the funding
criteria of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.”
See Investopedia, Conforming Loan,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/conformingloan.asp.
130. See Benjamin J. Keys, et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From
Subprime Loans, 1, 4 World Bank, (April 2008) (discussing the fact that the underwriting
guidelines established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cautioned against lending to borrowers
with FICO scores below 620 because such a score is a “strong indication that the borrower’s credit
is not acceptable.”), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/
VigSecuritize0808.pdf.
131. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit
Records,
Lender
Letter
No.
03-00
(Apr.
11,
2000),
available
at
http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2000/lendltrs2000.pdf;
Press
Release,
Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Promotes Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration
Policy (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/afford_housing/
2003/consumer_120403.html; Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac’s stance against
predatory
lending
practices
(Dec.
28,
2000),
available
at
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/1228indltr.pdf.
132. Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Says the U.S. Needs to Maintain a Role in Mortgage Securities,
WALL ST. J. Nov. 1, 2008, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122547596549288517.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
133. James B. Lockhart, FHFA Director, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart, 1, 5
(Sept. 7, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
fhfa_statement_090708hp1128.pdf).
134. See Reddy, supra note 132. Bernanke further stated that “whether the GSE model is viable
without at least implicit government support is an open question.” See id. For a more detailed
discussion of Bernanke’s blueprint for handling the mortgage-securitization crisis, see id.
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standards of their own.” 135 Nevertheless, in general, “only market actors
with high reputational risk, such as bank holding companies contemplating
mergers or lenders previously sanctioned for abusive lending, go to such
lengths” to attain proper standards. 136 For the majority of market
participants, industry self-policing is virtually nonexistent, and as a result,
in the nonconforming market for subprime RMBS, lenders and underwriters
“rarely screen out loans that are not [expressly] prohibited by law, even if
those loans violate industry standards or inflict significant harm on
borrowers.” 137 Moreover, underwriters are “under constant pressure to relax
their due diligence, for fear that lenders will move their underwriting
business to other underwriting firms,” with more lax standards of due
diligence. 138 In sum, because of these inherent conflicts of interest, the best
practices have not been voluntarily adopted in the subprime secondary
market and will not screen out predatory loans from loan pools unless
compelled by changes in regulation.
Investors, looking to screen out predatory loans, tend to rely on due
diligence by rating agencies, underwriters and lenders. 139 While
institutional investors will generally review the disclosures, ratings,
structure, and credit enhancements if presented with advance opportunity, if
they are not, institutional investors tend to be passive, especially regarding
predatory lending concerns. 140 The futility of such reliance is shown by at
least one study examining securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts,
which suggests that “securitization adversely affects the screening
incentives of lenders.” 141
D. THE DANGERS OF DEMAND
Lastly, Engel and McCoy identify excess demand for subprime
securitizations as the final reason why investors do not screen subprime
RMBS for predatory practices. 142 “In 2004, for instance, Standard & Poor’s
135. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070; see generally Securitization Post-Enron,
supra note 61, for a discussion of the differences between the conforming and nonconforming
markets.
136. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id.; see also Penner, supra note 91, at A11.
139. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070.
140. Moreover, “investors rarely reserve the right post-closing to be notified of predatory
lending complaints, to conduct random spot checks, or to perform special audits of lenders when
warning signs of predatory lending crop up.” However, it is this after-the-fact monitoring that
may be the only way to detect certain types of loan fraud and predatory servicing. Further,
numerous subprime securitizations are floated on a to-be-announced (TBA) basis, and investors
cannot exercise due diligence even when they want to. This is because in TBA offerings loans
have not yet been pooled, and although investors can reserve the right to review the eventual loan
pool chosen by the lender post-closing, this is risky because the investor has lost leverage once
they have parted with their funds. See id. at 2071.
141. See Keys, et al., supra note 130, at 2.
142. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075.
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(S&P) 143 observed that ‘the market for subprime mortgage securities
[experienced] significantly more demand than availability for many
issuances.’” 144 The liquidity of Rule 144A private placements makes them
in short supply. 145 As a result of the demand for bonds in subprime
securitization exceeding the supply, “investors are willing to purchase
bonds without engaging in thorough due diligence.” 146
Consequently, the risk management techniques used by loan
securitizers do not trickle down to deter lending abuses. Until the recent
financial crisis, it was believed investors were protected so well by
structured finance that S&P routinely assured investors that subprime
RMBS “[would] continue to perform in accordance with expectations,
given the advances in loan level modeling, structural safeguards, and
improvement in loss mitigation techniques.” 147 It is clear now that such
assurances were unwarranted, as “the world’s two largest bond-analysis
providers,” S&P and Moody’s Corp, 148 were engaging in a “race to the
bottom,” and “repeatedly eased their standards as they pursued profits from
structured investment pools sold by their clients, according to company
documents, e-mails and interviews with more than 50 Wall Street
professionals.” 149
These lending abuses have led to significant harms. When lenders make
loans that borrowers cannot afford to repay, borrowers must either reduce
spending on necessities such as health insurance, medical bills, day care and
critical home repairs, or lose their homes to foreclosure. “When predatory
lending results in vacant homes and neighborhood decline, cities lose tax
revenues and must pay for added police protection and other city
services.” 150 The total cost to homeowners and cities is in the billions of
143. Standard and Poor’s is “the world’s foremost provider of independent credit ratings,
indices, risk evaluation, investment research and data.”
Standard & Poor’s,
http://www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
144. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075 (quoting S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential
Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector, Fourth-Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005)).
145. Additionally, there is demand for subprime RMBS of all types, driven by portfolio
regulation of institutional investors such as banks and insurance companies, and many institutional
investors have legal limits on the types of investments they can buy for their own account.
Because of these limits, high yields make subprime RMBS attractive, particularly “when other
legal investments are in the doldrums.” Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2076 (quoting S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector,
Fourth-Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005)).
148. “Moody’s Investors Service is among the world’s most respected and widely utilized
sources for credit ratings, research and risk analysis.” Moody’s Investor Service, Introduction to
Moody’s,
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=intro&redir_url=/
cust/AboutMoodys/staticRedirect.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
149. Elliot Blair Smith, ‘Race to Bottom’ at Moody’s, S&P Secured Subprime’s Boom, Bust,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home
&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
150. Engel, supra note 26, at 355–60.
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dollars. 151 Thus, while investors receive some protections, these come at the
expense of borrowers and cities.
IV. A MENU OF INADEQUATE REMEDIES
Although the states and federal government are working towards
establishing standards and regulations to redress predatory lending, as the
law stands today, the remedies that exist are inadequate. “Instead, victims of
predatory lending currently must rely on a loose assortment of statutes and
common-law rules that were not designed to address the devastating harm
[to cities, borrowers and even investors] inflicted by predatory lenders.” 152
Remedies are rooted in traditional liberal notions of “informed consent and
free will,” and “consistent with that liberal ideology, under current
remedies, predatory-lending contracts are generally enforceable except
where fraud or nondisclosure has operated in some way that is inimical to
free will.” 153 However, “[b]arring this sort of culpable [process-oriented]
misrepresentation [by the securitizer or lenders], . . . the law normally does
not question the substance of predatory-loan terms.” 154
A. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW REMEDIES
Remedies under contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) are inadequate. “Most contract defenses go to defects in formation
of assent, rather than to disparities in bargaining power or fairness in
contracts’ substantive provisions.” 155 Although the three doctrines of
unconscionability, impracticability, and frustration under the law of
contracts and the UCC permit challenges to the underlying substance of
contract provisions, 156 the latter two “generally do not apply to predatorylending cases.” 157 Moreover, the doctrine of unconscionability’s value in
practice is nominal at best.
“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract.” 158 Further, a court “may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or . . . limit the

151. See Quercia, supra note 25, at 5, 27; Eric Stein, Quantifying the Economic Cost of
Predatory Lending (2001) (estimating losses from predatory lending at $9.1 billion annually)
available at http://www.selegal.org/Cost%20of%20Predatory%20Lending.pdf.
152. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1298.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1299.
156. See id.; see generally Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual
Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1982) (discussing the viability of different justifications for a
party seeking a cessation of contractual relations).
157. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1299.
158. Id. at 1300.
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application of [the] clause to avoid any unconscionable result.” 159 As
applied to home loans, this attempts to account for the complexity of loan
terms by voiding certain predatory terms. In addition, rules exist when
parties who purchased loans on the secondary market sue delinquent
borrowers. 160 “In those cases, the borrowers’ ability to raise defenses is
severely limited by the holder-in-due-course doctrine,” 161 which defines a
holder in due course as the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii)
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or
that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another
instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the
instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v)
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in § 3-306, and
(vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment
described in § 3-305(a). 162

This allows a secondary-market purchaser to defeat all “personal”
defenses to the loan agreement, including unconscionability, if it meets the
requirements of a holder in due course. 163
Finally, unconscionability claims and defenses are extremely expensive
to litigate, dampening incentives to bring those claims, and a lender may be
able to defeat the claim by adducing proof that the high price of the loan is
justified by risk-based pricing, where prices rise in response to the added
risk presented by the borrower. 164 As a result, these limitations make it
exceedingly difficult for borrowers to challenge predatory-loan agreements
as void under traditional contract law or the UCC.

159. Id. Unconscionability has been defined to include “an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party.” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For
a number of reasons, many courts have been reluctant to condemn excessive prices as
unconscionable, without more. See id.
160. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1300.
161. This doctrine is contained in U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005).
162. Id.
163. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1300.
164. See Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a
Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2000) (“[D]isgruntled consumers are not likely to succeed in
ligation on grounds of unconscionability”); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd –
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 354–57 (1970).
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B. ANTIQUATED AND INEFFECTIVE
Antifraud laws are designed to redress information asymmetries in the
formation of contracts. 165 However, their extensive proof requirements and
limited scope make them antiquated and ineffective. “Common-law fraud
requires proof of affirmative misrepresentation and does not encompass
misleading omissions or manipulation,” in addition to requiring “proof of
detrimental reliance by the borrower,” 166 which victims of predatory
lending must show for the protection of these laws. Thus the “limited scope
of common-law fraud, coupled with pragmatic concerns, has constrained
the number of criminal fraud prosecutions against predatory lenders and
brokers.” 167 Moreover, “[e]ffective criminal fraud prosecution depends on
the willingness of district attorneys to prosecute predatory-lending fraud,”
and “limited local expertise, constrained resources, and other pressing
prosecutorial demands—such as violent crime and drug trafficking—
combine to militate against prosecuting predatory lenders.” 168
Although private causes of action for common-law fraud are an
alternative route for victims of predatory lending, “fraud” is narrowly
defined in common law, making it difficult to pursue such an action.169
Moreover, common-law fraud actions may not afford victims full relief in
the form of loan forgiveness. 170 This, coupled with the high cost of
attorneys’ fees, makes incentives to file suits for equitable relief (such as
rescission or loan forgiveness) inadequate for private action, as these cases
generally do not generate sufficient funds to compensate plaintiffs’
counsel. 171 Furthermore, the need to prove individual reliance in fraud cases
often makes it difficult to bring class actions, so potential plaintiffs have
difficulty working together to protect their rights. 172 In addition,
“mandatory-arbitration clauses in many predatory loan-agreements preclude
resort to court altogether.” 173 These problems have not been solved despite
federal and state attempts at protective legislation.
As a response to the limitations of common-law fraud, the unfair and
deceptive acts and practices legislation (UDAP) has been passed in all fifty

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1301.
Id. See also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 537–45 (1977).
A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1302.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
These difficulties are both practical and legal. From a practical standpoint, in a very large
class with plaintiffs from all over the country, it is difficult to show individual detrimental reliance
for each borrower, as one would have to go above and beyond the normal requirements in
certifying a class for such an action and actually handle each class member’s case on an almost
individual basis to show such reliance. From a legal standpoint, this could cause a case to last such
a long time as to threaten the judicial economy that class actions are meant to serve. See id.
173. Id. at 1302–03.
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states, the District of Columbia, and in Congress. 174 Although the federal
statute, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
trade or commerce, 175 grants enforcement to the Federal Trade
Commission 176 (FTC), it does not provide a private right of action (either
express or implied). 177 Moreover, while state UDAP statutes usually allow
for private damage actions as well as state enforcement, they are sometimes
restricted in their scope. 178
C. STATUTORY FAILURE
While several federal statutes mandate the disclosure of standardized
price information on loans in consumer lending, 179 these statutes all have
major weaknesses. Although more recently states have responded to the
problem of evading HOEPA by adopting measures that lower the coverage
triggers for lenders in those states, 180 this increased disclosure is not enough
because lenders will always find ways to evade disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, the majority of victims of predatory lending already find
174. See generally National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
1.1. (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES].
175. See Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2) (2000).
176. While the FTC has filed a number of recent enforcement actions challenging actions by
predatory lenders as unfair and deceptive under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
with some resulting in monetary relief to borrowers, the absence of a private cause of action,
shifting political winds, and constraints on the FTC’s enforcement resources “make private relief
under the Federal Trade Commission Act highly unlikely for the vast majority of victimized
borrowers.” A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1304.
177. See UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 174, at 9.1; A Tale of
Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1304.
178. For example, some state statutes exclude credit and insurance transactions, often because
financial institutions are exempted or because credit and insurance are deemed not to be “goods
and services.” This essentially would exempt the lenders and SPVs who are involved in these
transactions from liability under such a statute. Moreover, weak attorneys’ fees provisions in some
state UDAP statutes discourage the private bar from bringing state UDAP claims, leaving
plaintiffs with little recourse, even in instances of fraud. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note
18, at 1304; UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 174, at 8.1.
179. For example, TILA requires lenders to disclose finance charges and annual percentage
rates to applicants for home mortgages, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
entitles home-mortgage borrowers to good-faith estimates of settlement costs (GFEs) and
statements of their actual closing costs in HUD-1 settlement statements. See A Tale of Three
Markets, supra note 18, at 1304; 15 U.S.C. 1601-1693(c) (2000) (TILA); see also 12 U.S.C. 26012617 (2000) (RESPA).
180. Enacted in 1999, North Carolina’s predatory-lending statute was the first. It retained the
federal trigger for APRs of ten percent, but lowered the trigger for total points and fees to five
percent for total loan amounts greater than or equal to $ 20,000, or the lesser of $ 1000 or eight
percent of principal for smaller loans. The statute is also broader than HOEPA in that it covers
home mortgages with prepayment penalties that either exceed two percent of the amount prepaid
or are payable more than thirty months after closing. In 2000, the New York Banking Board
amended part 41 of its regulations to lower the APR trigger from ten to eight percent and the
trigger for total points and fees from eight to five percent. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note
18, at 1304; N.C. Gen. Stat. 24-1.1E(a)(4), (a)(6) (1999); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 3,
41.1(d)-(3) (2000).
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current disclosures incomprehensible, and piling on more disclosures will
not help. 181
Federal statutes have not succeeded in filling in the gaps left by state
law. For high-cost, closed-end mortgages (other than purchase moneymortgages), HOEPA requires additional disclosures three days before
closing. 182 Although violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and HOEPA are subject
to agency enforcement, violators of TILA and HOEPA are also subject to
criminal penalties. 183 “In addition, TILA, 184 RESPA, 185 and HOEPA 186
authorize private rights of action, but differ significantly in the types of
relief they afford borrowers.” 187 These statutes do not succeed in the
activities they seek to prohibit and the relief they provide. 188 For example,
TILA “has not lived up to its goal of standardizing disclosures on the total
cost of credit because a long list of closing costs are currently excluded
181. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1309.
182. Under HOEPA’s advance disclosure provisions, the lender must inform the borrower of

the annual percentage rate (“APR”), which is the effective interest rate the borrower will pay on a
loan, the dollar amount of the periodic payments, the size of any balloon payments, the amount
borrowed, and any charges for optional credit insurance or debt-cancellation coverage. HOEPA
lenders must also advise borrowers in writing that they may lose their homes and are not obligated
to proceed to closing simply because they signed a loan application or received disclosures.
Lastly, for adjustable-rate mortgages that fall within HOEPA, lenders must disclose that the
interest rate and monthly payment could increase, plus the amount of the single maximum
monthly payment. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1305; 15 U.S.C. 1601, 1602(aa),
1639(a)-(b) (2000) (TILA).
183. “Lenders who willfully and knowingly violate any requirement of TILA or HOEPA, for
example, face a maximum fine of $ 5000 and imprisonment for up to one year.” A Tale of Three
Markets, supra note 18, at 1305 n.212; see also 15 U.S.C. 1611 (2000) (TILA).
184. “Under TILA, injured borrowers may seek actual damages, statutory damages, and
attorneys’ fees, either individually or in class actions, and may stave off foreclosure for up to three
years after closing under TILA’s provisions, where specified disclosures were not correctly made
at closing.” A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; see generally NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING ch. 8 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter TRUTH IN
LENDING].
185. “Under RESPA, private damages for erroneous disclosures generally cannot be awarded
unless borrowers can prove that lenders: (1) failed to inform them that their loans could be
transferred, (2) received kickbacks, or (3) steered them to title companies. Specifically lenders
have no liability under RESPA for errors in GFEs or HUD-1 settlement statements, thereby
weakening their incentives for accuracy.” See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; 12
U.S.C. 2605(f)-2608 (2000) (RESPA).
186. “HOEPA’s private remedies include all of the remedies that are available under TILA, plus
special enhanced damages consisting of all finance charges and fees paid by the borrower and
expanded rights of rescission.” A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; see also 15
U.S.C. 1640(a)(4) (2000) (TILA); see generally TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, at 10.3.3,
10.6.
187. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306–07.
188. HUD and the Federal Reserve Board raised concerns about the efficacy of these statutes in
a joint report to Congress. See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & FED. RES. BOARD, JOINT
REPORT TO CONGRESS, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE PROCEDURES ACT,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II (1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
rptcongress/tila.pdf.
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when computing financial charges and annual percentage rates.” 189 In
addition, although HOEPA has made improvements, it is easy to evade
because of its narrow coverage, and it does not apply to purchase-money
mortgages, reverse mortgages, or open-end credit lines of any kind. 190 More
importantly, HOEPA only applies if (1) the annual percentage rate at
consummation exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of comparable
maturity plus eight percent for first-lien loans (or ten percent for
subordinate-lien loans); or (2) the total points and fees exceed eight percent
of the total loan amount or $400 (subject to annual indexing), whichever is
greater. 191 As a result, to evade HOEPA, a lender can either style a loan as
an open-end extension of credit, or keep the interest or total points and fees
below the respective ten-and eight-percent triggers, which are so high that
most lenders, including predatory lenders, are able to price their loans
below them. 192
V. IT’S NOT THEIR FAULT: WHY ASSIGNEES SHOULD NOT BE
HELD LIABLE
In their March 2007 article, Engel and McCoy argue that, given
“securitization’s role in enabling and perpetuating predatory lending . . . the
law should impose full, quantifiable assignee liability on securitized trusts
that do not adopt adequate controls to filter out predatory loans from loan
pools.” 193 In addition, they argue that assignee liability should apply to
suitability violations and certain other legal violations by mortgage brokers
and lenders. 194 Their proposal seeks to hold the secondary market
responsible for policing lenders. 195 A system of assignee liability is used
whereby entities that engage in due diligence designed to detect loans with
abusive terms have their liability capped. 196 Further, they propose extending
assignee liability only to specific causes of action, including: (1) common
law tort claims, such as fraud and improvident lending; (2) contract claims
such as unconscionability; and (3) claims under state and local antipredatory lending laws. 197 Additionally, they would impose liability on
assignees for violations of a national suitability standard that they
previously proposed in an earlier article. 198

189.
190.
191.
192.

A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306–07.
Id. at 1307. See also 15 U.S.C. 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2000) (TILA).
See 15 U.S.C. 1602(aa)(1)-(4) (2000) (TILA); TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, 3.9.
See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1307–08; see also HUD-TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 17, at 85; TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, at 10.1.1.
193. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2042.
194. Id. at 2081.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2089.
198. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1366.
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Although their proposal would provide new forms of redress for
borrowers who have been victims of predatory lending, it seeks to do so by
holding liable those who have purchased these securitized predatory loans
on the secondary market. 199 This seems counterintuitive, in that borrowers
have had no contact whatsoever with these purchasers, nor were the
purchasers involved at any stage of the lending process. 200 While Engel and
McCoy insist that this proposal would not espouse radical changes to the
secondary market by comparing the due diligence proposed to that currently
adopted by GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 201 those organizations are
substantially larger than many of the private actors involved in this market,
so the proposal could drive out many of these actors from the market.
Through increased costs of due diligence, there is a danger of driving out
legitimate credit if such a proposal were imposed. As stated earlier,
legitimate subprime lending is necessary to provide a source of credit to
borrowers that otherwise may have no such access to credit. 202 By imposing
such heightened due diligence requirements on secondary market actors,
actors that had nothing to do with the original loan process would subject
themselves to substantial potential liability to borrowers, in addition to the
high costs of such heightened due diligence. Engel and McCoy state that
there is evidence that state anti-predatory lending laws have not had an
adverse impact on the flow of subprime credit. 203 However, as they
themselves made clear in this and an earlier article, 204 the current state antipredatory lending laws are quite ineffective, and as such, one would not
“expect them to have had too strong of an impact on ‘the flow of subprime
credit.’” 205
As a result, although Engel and McCoy are truly experts in this field,
their most recent proposal seems, at this point, to go too far in looking to
impose assignee liability on secondary market actors. However, it remains
to be seen whether, if there is a regulator either created or assigned to this
industry, their proposal could be in turn adopted. 206 If there were such a
regulator for the industry, then at least some of the costs associated with

199. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21.
200. Purchasers on the secondary market buy securities that include loans made by banks and

SPVs to borrowers that already contain the predatory loans. This is because the “lenders [don’t]
care,” because they have sold the mortgages and “their hands [are] clean.” See David Hendricks,
Financing of Homes Must Change, MY SA BUSINESS, Sept. 9, 2008,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/columnists/david_hendricks/Financing_of_homes_must_
change.html.
201. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2095.
202. See supra Part I.
203. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2098.
204. See generally, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18.
205. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2096–7.
206. A regulator was proposed in Engel & McCoy’s earlier article A Tale of Three Markets,
supra note 18.
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their proposal would be reduced, and there would be much lower risk of
losing critical actors in what was at one time a profitable and vital industry.
VI. HELP IS AROUND THE CORNER
Current regulation and remedies in the subprime industry do not
address the grave problems in the subprime lending industry. Remedies and
regulations, some of which allow actors like extant SPVs to avoid any
liability despite being involved in the securitization of loan pools that
include predatory loans, are one major problem. 207 Coupled with the lack of
a true regulator for the subprime lending industry, these matters have
allowed the entities involved in this industry to continue to avoid liability
despite dealing in illegal predatory loans. Although there are agencies that
regulate certain entities involved in securitization, 208 these agencies do not
regulate the subprime lending industry as a whole. Legislation should thus
be passed to either create a new regulatory organization to oversee the
lending industry and resulting securitization, or designate the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the industry’s regulator. By
having a regulator specifically for the lending and securitization industry,
consumer-protection mechanisms or remedies that do have potential to be
effective may be more properly applied, in addition to creating true
accountability for those who continue to violate proper lending practices.
This, in turn, would allow for SPVs to be held accountable for engaging in
securitization of loan pools that contain predatory loans, without leaving it
in the hands of secondary market actors, or lenders themselves to comply
with proper lending practices. Therefore, legislation must be passed to
cover this industry and force industry actors to comply with appropriate
lending practice standards.
A. THE NEED FOR A REGULATOR
First, all entities that desire to be involved in the lending industry and
resulting securitization should be required to register with this new
regulator, similar to member firms who register with the Financial
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in order to participate in trading
securities. 209 In conjunction with this requirement, these actors should be
required to adopt the “best practice standards” that were created by the
207. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21.
208. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency “charters, regulates, and

supervises all national banks.” As a result, although they have worked towards identifying
predatory practices within their regulation of national banks, most mortgage creating institutions
are outside this scope, and other agencies have to fill this regulatory gap in order to be successful
in stopping predatory lending practices. See Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of
National Banks, About the OCC, http://www.occtreas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2007).
209. “FINRA is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the
United States.” See FINRA homepage, http://www.finra.org/index.htm.
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GSEs involved in this industry, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This would
require, for example, that lenders eliminate certain prepayment terms and
balloon clauses that make their loans predatory. As stated above, those
currently outside of the “conforming market” are free to adopt internal
standards of their own, which has resulted in very few actors adopting the
“best practices.” 210 By requiring all entities in this industry to adopt the best
practices in order to qualify to participate in this market, there would finally
be a new sheriff in town.
To ensure compliance with the “best practice” standards, the SPVs’
securitized products should be subject to a thorough investigation prior to
being sold on the secondary market to investors (assignees). A regulator
could apply the fraud provisions 211 from the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to these securities if they have not complied with the required
standards, thus subjecting them to criminal liability, in addition to a private
right of action that courts have implied in cases under this statute. 212 The
best practice standards would require heightened disclosure by the SPVs of
the quality of loans being securitized, as well as an explanation by lenders
to borrowers of the clear meanings of the various loan terms. By subjecting
the entities involved in subprime lending to such standards, in addition to
regulation by an industry regulator, those that did not comply with the
disclosure requirements would violate the fraud provisions for making a
material misstatement. This would incentivize SPVs to fulfill their due
diligence and disclosure requirements more properly and not just engage in
aggregation of acceptable loans and predatory loans in order to assemble
more diversified loan pools, without increasing significantly the costs of
secondary market actors to participate in this industry. 213
B. EVENING THE PLAYING FIELD
Moreover, SPVs should be exempted from the protection of the
“holder-in-due-course” rule that reduces SPV’s legal risk. The new
regulator of this industry should apply a rebuttable presumption of bad faith
when an SPV attempts to sell securitized loan pools that contain predatory
loans to investors. This would be fair, as the SPVs would be aware that they
were subject to heightened due diligence requirements in selling these
loans, and as a result should have screened out such predatory loans prior to
securitizing and attempting to sell the product to investors. Thus, the SPV
210. See supra Part III, C.
211. See Securites and Exchange Act of 1934, § 2B, 15 U.S.C. §78(j)(b) (2000); see also 17

C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2007).
212. Id.
213. This is because if the regulator would be responsible for investigating loan pools to make
sure they comply with the requisite standards as opposed to the secondary market actor being
solely responsible for ensuring compliance, the overall costs can be reduced for the secondary
market actors, shared with the regulator. Further, if the regulator is funded by the government,
then costs will be spread throughout the nation from United States tax dollars.
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would not qualify as a “holder-in-due-course,” because to do so, holders of
an instrument must be doing so in good faith. 214 It could be argued that this
would disincentivize SPVs from participating in the lending industry
because of the potential liability and increased costs. However, because of
the potential for lucrative profits, and the marginal costs in requiring SPVs
to conduct proper due diligence and comply with best practice standards
(when they would be doing so in conjunction with a regulator also using its
resources to screen loan pools), this would help curb the predatory lending
problem, without removing these entities from this profitable market.
C. WE NEED DILIGENCE
In conjunction with removing SPVs from the “holder-in-due-course”
exemption, there should be changes made in the due diligence requirements
that currently exist in this industry. SPVs must be incentivized to insist on
proper due diligence compliance by lenders, such as subjecting them to
liability along with lenders 215 (for example a substantial fine, and after
multiple violations a bar from participating in the lending and securitization
markets). Moreover, in cases of Rule 144A offerings, substantive due
diligence on the part of the institutional investor (the SPV) should be
required apart from any conducted by the lenders, underwriters, or rating
agencies. As stated above, predatory loans may avoid SEC regulation if
they qualify for the Rule 144A exemption, which can be easily achieved. It
is necessary to remove Rule 144A offerings from this exemption, and
subject them to SEC regulation or at least to that of a new industry
regulator.
Another change that should be made is to require lenders to retain their
interest in the subordinated tranches that they helped create in securitizing
the loan pools. By forcing these lenders to retain their residuals, they would
be incentivized to make sure that they were safe loans in the first place. The
central purpose of residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the credit
risk they create and by forcing them to retain the residuals, they would not
be able to avoid the credit risk of improper loans and the potential defaults
on re-payment of such loans. As a result, this would allow the market
discipline that residuals were meant to exert on lenders to actually be
effective.
As stated above, the current federal and state law regimes have
numerous holes that allow predatory lenders to escape their reach.216
Although some states have begun to resolve this problem by lowering
coverage triggers within their state, states are not equipped with the
214. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005).
215. As stated above, this would at least in part be due to SPVs exemption from the protections

of the holder-in-due-course rule, whenever predatory loans comprised part of a securitized loan
pool that was being sold to investors.
216. See supra Part IV.C.
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financial experience and regulatory capacity necessary to combat the
creativity of predatory lenders. 217 Thus, the SEC, or a regulator that would
be specifically created for this industry, would apply its expertise in this
area to determine whether an appropriate coverage trigger for applying
HOEPA would be nationwide.
Moreover, even where due diligence is required, there is an inherent
conflict of interest when the underwriters who appraise the scrutinized loans
work for the lenders. “Securitization may be the only business in the world
where the appraiser is hired by, paid by, and thus works for, the seller rather
than the buyer.” 218 For example, “it would be unthinkable in a real estate
transaction for the seller of a property to expect that the buyer would accept
a seller-provided appraisal as the basis of the buyer’s valuation, and yet this
is exactly what transpires in the bond market.” 219 Thus, this conflict of
interest must be removed and realigned. This could be accomplished by
either requiring the rating agencies to work for the bond buyers, or at the
very least by requiring full disclosure to the borrowers that the agencies
work for or with the lenders. If these agencies do not comply with such
disclosure requirements, they should be subject to criminal liability brought
by the regulator of the industry, as well as a private cause of action brought
by a victimized borrower.
D. GIVING BORROWERS A CHANCE
Another necessary change in the current remedial structure is an
adjustment of the requirements for common law fraud actions pursued by
borrowers against lenders who have purveyed predatory loans. As stated
previously, the current state of the law makes it very difficult for borrowers
to successfully bring individual anti-fraud actions, as they are costly and
have difficult proof requirements for plaintiffs. The “American Rule,” 220 in
which each party bears it own attorneys’ fees and costs, provides incentives
to file suits for injunctive relief, such as rescission or loan forgiveness
inadequate for the private bar. This, coupled with the need to prove
individual reliance in fraud cases, often makes it difficult to bring class
actions. 221 However, there are solutions to these complex problems.
One solution would be to adjust the traditional “American Rule” in the
context of cases involving fraudulent predatory loans to borrowers. If
legislation is passed to allow recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs by the
prevailing party for specifically these circumstances, borrowers with
legitimate suits could afford to bring claims against a fraudulent lender who
217.
218.
219.
220.

See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1305.
Penner, supra note 91, at A11.
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has purveyed a predatory loan. This would not threaten the judicial
economy, as borrowers with frivolous suits would be deterred from
bringing such a suit for fear of having to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees
and costs, while incentivizing those with legitimate suits to come forward
and help combat the predatory lenders that exist throughout the nation.
Another solution to these complex problems of bringing a loan fraud
action for borrowers is to change the proof requirements when bringing a
class action. Instead of requiring proof of individual reliance in fraud cases,
which is quite impractical, this area of the law could adopt the fraud-on-themarket theory, which is applied in the case of materially misleading
statements made by directors on a corporation’s behalf to the detriment of
shareholders. 222 This theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and its
business. 223 Thus, misleading statements will defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. 224 As
applied to the lending industry, this would allow for class action borrowers
to avoid having to show direct reliance on a fraudulent misstatement
regarding the loan terms. Instead, a rebuttable presumption of reliance
would be applied. It would then be the lenders’ burden to rebut such a
presumption. The policy behind this theory is that requiring proof of
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class
effectively would prevent these plaintiffs (borrowers) from proceeding with
a class action, since individual issues then would overwhelm the common
ones. 225 While this is a different situation than the case in which the
doctrine developed, the central principle remains the same: investors or
borrowers rely on the integrity of the price set by the market, and forcing
plaintiffs in these cases to show a speculative state of facts (for example,
how he or she would have acted if omitted material information had been
disclosed, or if the misrepresentation had not been made), would place an
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs. The presumption of reliance
employed in these instances is consistent with congressional policy
embodied in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 226

222. This theory was applied in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), where a
corporation issued three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations
when it really was, and as a result, plaintiffs alleged they had sold their shares at artificially
depressed prices in a market affected by the corporation’s misleading statements in reliance
thereon.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 224.
226. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Consequently, it is apparent that in the current state of affairs, the
subprime lending industry will not fix itself through self-regulation or
existing remedies. There are significant gaps existing in the current law, and
the remedies that are available for borrowers are inadequate. Further, the
entities involved in predatory subprime lending and securitization of loan
pools that include predatory loans have no incentives to divert from their
current behaviors, as they have not been faced with liability for
noncompliance with the standards and practices of proper subprime
lending. Thus, it is clear that these entities need to be regulated, and through
SRO regulation, current standards and mechanisms that exist to prevent
predatory subprime lending must be adjusted to properly combat this
harmful practice. In addition to this regulation, if at least some of the
aforementioned changes are made to the current remedial system in place,
borrowers and investors will receive meaningful recourse, without
subjecting profit-seeking actors in the subprime lending and securitization
industry to prohibitive costs. Furthermore, going forward, noncompliance
with new regulations and rules would subject the entities in this industry to
fines, a bar from the industry, and criminal or substantial civil liability.
Inscribed on the pediment of Winston Churchill’s statute at the site of the
Winston Churchill Memorial and Library is the epigraph from Churchill’s
History of the Second World War: “In war, resolution. In defeat, defiance.
In victory, magnanimity. In peace, good will.” 227
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